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Abstract 
Who will pay for new policies to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas 
emissions in the United States? This paper considers a slice of the question by examining the 
near-term impact on domestic manufacturing industries of both upstream (economy-wide) and 
downstream (electric power industry only) carbon mitigation policies. 
Detailed Census data on the electricity use of four-digit manufacturing industries is 
combined with input-output information on interindustry purchases to paint a detailed picture of 
carbon use, including effects on final demand. This approach, which freezes capital and other 
inputs at current levels and assumes that all costs are passed forward, yields upper-bound 
estimates of total costs. The results are best viewed as descriptive of the relative burdens within 
the manufacturing sector rather than as a measure of absolute costs. Overall, the principal 
conclusion is that within the manufacturing sector (which by definition excludes coal production 
and electricity generation), only a small number of industries would bear a disproportionate 
short-term burden of a carbon tax or similar policy. Not surprisingly, an electricity-only policy 
affects very different manufacturing industries than an economy-wide carbon tax. 
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 The Near-Term Impacts of Carbon Mitigation Policies on 
Manufacturing Industries  
Richard D. Morgenstern, Mun Ho, Jhih-Shyang Shih, and Xuehua Zhang1 
 
I. Introduction 
Who will pay for new policies to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in the United States? Over the past several years considerable strides have 
been made in understanding how much it will cost to reduce GHG emissions. Yet little attention 
has been paid to the distribution of these costs across industries or household groups. Not 
surprisingly, disagreements over the magnitude of the costs imposed on the electric utility versus 
coal mining versus steel industries, or rich versus poor households, can stymie efforts to reach 
consensus on the basic GHG mitigation strategy to be undertaken. Disagreements over the 
distribution of the burden can also impede the development of compensatory policies designed to 
offset the economic damages imposed on particular groups or industries.  
As Mancur Olson (1965) argued almost four decades ago, the more narrowly focused the 
adverse impacts of a given policy, the more politically difficult it is to sustain that policy. Claims 
of high and unfair burdens imposed on selected industries or households are widely seen as 
having doomed the Btu tax advanced by the Clinton Administration in 1993: to this day there is 
still disagreement on the true magnitude of the burdens that tax would have imposed. 
Most research on how much it will cost society to limit carbon emissions has been 
conducted in a long-run, general equilibrium framework where the cost is expressed as 
reductions in gross domestic product (GDP) or as the discounted stream of future consumption 
(Weyant and Hill 1999). Most studies estimate the long-run cost of carbon control policies, after 
firms have adjusted by adopting lower-carbon fuels and energy-efficient technologies, and after 
new import patterns are established. Thus, the cost borne by society represents the forgone 
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consumption opportunities as individuals alter their buying patterns. Labor and owners of capital 
are not affected, since in the long run, they shift to meet the new pattern of consumer demand.2  
In the near term (zero to five years), however, firms cannot costlessly remold their 
factories and machines in response to higher energy and other input costs. For a variety of 
reasons, including competition from imports, affected firms may not be able to pass along all 
additional costs to their customers. The resulting losses to the owners and workers of such firms 
could be significant. This paper considers a slice of the who pays question by examining the 
near-term impact of alternative carbon mitigation policies on domestic manufacturing industries. 
A carbon tax or an upstream emissions trading system is the principal policy analyzed. In 
addition, comparisons are made to a downstream policy focused exclusively on the electric 
power industry. Both direct usage in the form of energy products combusted and indirect usage 
embodied in purchased products are considered. 
Assuming the costs of carbon mitigation policies are fully passed forward in the near 
term, then knowledge of carbon use, both direct and indirect, makes it possible to measure the 
increased production costs associated with alternative policies. For example, the near-term cost 
of a $25 per ton carbon tax (or permit) to a firm that uses 100 tons of carbon would be $2,500. 
By coupling detailed 1992 Census data on electricity use of four-digit manufacturing industries 
with input-output (I-O) information on interindustry purchases, we are able to paint a detailed 
picture of carbon use. With the detailed input-output accounts, including final demand (domestic 
use as well as imports and exports), we also describe the effects of carbon control from the 
perspective of final demand. We estimate how such policies raise the near-term price of each 
commodity purchased by final users.3  
Though lacking the elegance of the general equilibrium models, this near-term analysis 
has the attraction of presenting information on the distribution of costs at a highly disaggregate 
level—in this case, 361 manufacturing industries. Of course, the net costs to a firm are the costs 
actually passed on to it, less the higher prices it can charge for its output, plus any reductions in 
sales associated with the higher prices. Estimating the degree of pass-through would require a 
careful study of each sector's industrial organization structure, which is beyond the scope of this 
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paper. It is important to keep this caveat in mind, however, when interpreting the results 
presented herein. In this paper we are estimating production costs, not net impacts on individual 
industries. Recent research finds that some industries in oligopolistic markets could well profit 
from higher prices and less competition (Goulder 2001; Burtraw et al. 2001). Since capital and 
other factor inputs are frozen at current levels, this near-term approach yields upper-bound 
estimates of total costs. Thus, the results are best viewed as descriptive of the relative burdens 
within the manufacturing sector, rather than as a measure of absolute costs. 
Section II describes the basic research design of the paper. Section III presents the 
empirical results on commodity price impacts to final users as well as the initial impacts on 
manufacturing industries—specifically, price increases across 361 commodities and industries, 
per dollar of carbon tax or permit imposed. We also estimate the contribution to these price 
increases of increased fuel costs, purchases of electricity, and purchases of nonenergy 
intermediate inputs. Section IV presents the results for the economy-wide versus electricity-
sector-only policies. Section V makes comparisons with more aggregate estimates derived from 
the general equilibrium models. Section VI offers overall conclusions about the potential near-
term impacts on manufacturing industries of carbon mitigation policies.  
II. Research Design 
To examine the who pays issue among fossil energy users from the twin perspectives of 
the initial industrial purchaser and the end user, we develop two distinct but related sets of data. 
First we construct a detailed picture of carbon use by individual manufacturing industries. Next 
we construct interindustry accounts, including final demand, for a detailed list of commodities. 
From this we calculate the impact on both consumer goods and manufacturing industries.  
Current carbon usage by industry is composed of fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) 
directly combusted by industry plus purchased electricity produced from these same fuels, and 
fuels indirectly combusted, involving the purchase of carbon-using intermediate goods and 
services. Given our desire to estimate the short-run effects—that is, before firms and final users 
are able to significantly change behavior or alter their capital stock—current carbon usage is a 
reasonable proxy for the relative mitigation burdens. We assume that a market-based approach is 
used that fixes a uniform cost (either a tax or a tradable permit) per ton of carbon.4 Under these 
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conditions, the additional input costs to firms will roughly equal the per ton tax (or permit 
charge) times the current level of carbon usage. The relative burden across industries, therefore, 
is measured by the current level of carbon usage. 
Our approach ignores the effects of the tax (or permit charge) on capital and labor inputs. 
Investment decisions would certainly be affected by carbon policies. However, we believe these 
should be considered in a well-designed dynamic framework rather than in the short-run analysis 
undertaken here. Another key assumption is that imports do not change significantly in the short 
run to offset the higher prices of domestic goods. The treatment of imports and World Trade 
Organization rules are active topics of discussion under the international climate negotiations, 
and it is important to keep this assumption in mind in interpreting our results. 
We also ignore the effects of changes to tax laws and public spending patterns that might 
be implemented in light of the new revenue from carbon taxes. For example, a reduction in sales 
taxes would offset some of the carbon policy-induced price increases. The emphasis is thus on 
relative effects—that is, how the different industries are affected relative to each other in a 
regime with market-based, nondiscriminatory carbon control policies. The absolute effect would 
depend, in part, on these other revenue-offsetting policies. 
We focus on marginal changes to the status quo. Very large carbon taxes might induce 
significant changes in behavior even in the short run. I 
n that case the methodology discussed here would not be appropriate.5 Over time, of 
course, as firms and households adapt, costs would be reduced. Our assumption of market 
instruments guarantees that any differences in the payment for emissions arise from differences 
in the level of emissions, and not from differences among firms in the per unit cost of mitigation.  
Let  j X  be the output of industry j, and the inputs of capital, labor, and m types of 
intermediate goods be  ) ,... , , ( 1 mj j j j u u l k . We partition the input vector into energy-related inputs 




j j u u u = , where  ,, ( , ,.....)
e
j coal j oil j uuu = . The direct 
carbon emissions attributable to j are: 
(1)
DCe
jf f f j
f
Ce u θ =∑  
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where  f θ  is the carbon content per Btu of fuel f, and  f e  is the energy content (Btu) per $ 
of fuel f.  
To have a full accounting of all carbon sources and users, we construct a complete set of 
accounts for all n industries.6 The value of output at purchasers' prices is equal to the value of 
inputs and taxes: 
(2) 1,2... ji j j j j
i
x uk l t a x j n =+ + + = ∑  
where kj,  j l  are the capital and labor compensation, and  j tax  is indirect business taxes 
(sales tax).7  
A matrix whose jth column is the input vector of commodities used by sector j is the "use 
matrix": 
(3) ] [ ij u = U  
Both the detailed industry accounts and input-output tables distinguish between industries 
and commodities even though they have the same names and reference numbers. The hotel 
industry, for example, produces a "hotel lodging" commodity and a "restaurant" commodity. And 
on the other side, each commodity may be produced by several industries. For example, the 
restaurant commodity is produced by the hotel industry and the restaurant industry, and 
electricity is produced by "electric services," "federal electric utilities," and "S&L government 
electric utilities." In the notation above,  ij u  is the use of commodity i by industry j.  




ji j m X  
where  ij m  is the output of commodity i by industry j (this is known as the "make" of 
commodities, hence the notation).  ] [ ji m = M , is the make matrix. The total output of commodity 
i from all industries is denoted by Q: 
(5) ∑ =
j
ji i m Q  
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We now turn to the total supply and demand of each commodity. The suppliers of good i 
are the domestic suppliers ( i Q ) and imports  i i . The users of good i are the industry purchases of 
intermediate products ( ij u ) and the final users (households, investors, government, and exports). 
Thus, the supply and demand balance is given by: 
(6) ∑ = + + + + = +
j
i i i i ij i i m i e g v c u i Q ,.... 2 , 1 
where  i i i i e g v c , , ,  are the consumption, investment, government, and export demand for 
good i. 
We define total final demand (Ei) as the familiar expression for gross domestic product 
(i.e., GDP = C + I + G + X - M). Thus, for commodity i, total final demand is: 
(7) i i i i i i i e g v c E − + + + =   
Equation (6) may be rewritten as: 
(8) ∑ = + =
j
i ij i m i E u Q ,.... 2 , 1 
We express emissions in terms of tons of carbon emitted per dollar of output. We define 








== A  
As noted, our focus is on the short run—before firms are able to change production 
processes significantly. Thus, we are assuming that the activity matrix A is not affected by 
carbon control policies. With this definition the total use matrix is given simply by: 
(10) X ˆ A U =  
where both U and A matrices are m by n, and  X ˆ  is a diagonal matrix of industry outputs. 
Similarly, we define the domestic commodity supply in per unit terms. The share of 
commodity i produced by industry j is : 






ji ˆ ]; [ ; 
where Q ˆ  is the diagonal matrix of commodity outputs. The industry output vector, 
) ,... ( 1 n X X X = , and the commodity vector,  ) ,... ( 1 m Q Q Q = , are then related via this make 
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Q X D =  
With the above elements we can now write the supply-demand balance (equation 8) for 
all m commodities in vector form: 
(12) E Q E X Q + = + = AD A  
This may be rewritten as: 
(13) E Q
1 ) (
− − = AD I  
where I  is the identity matrix. 
1 ()
− − IA D is known as the Leontief inverse, and it tells us 
that to produce a vector E of final demand commodities, the economy must produce a vector Q 
of gross output of commodities. In particular, this formulation expresses the additional outputs 
that must be produced if we want the economy to produce an extra unit of good i for final users. 
For example, if we want to produce one more dollar’s worth of motor vehicles, the economy 
must produce additional steel, glass, electricity, and so forth for the motor vehicle industry to buy 
as inputs. However, steel production needs motor vehicles, electricity, coal, and so forth, and 
electricity needs steel, coal, and on and on. The Leontief inverse gives us the grand total of extra 
outputs that are required for the economy to export one more dollar’s worth of motor vehicles. 





− ∆=− IA Di  
where  i i  is a vector with a 1 in the ith element, and zeros everywhere else. 
With this formulation, we can estimate the total additional carbon emissions due to one 
more unit of good i. The vector 
i Q ∆  gives us the additional coal, crude oil, and gas used. The 
input-output accounts even at the finest level of disaggregation have only one sector called 
"crude petroleum and natural gas." We refer to this with an oil-gas subscript. These primary 
energy elements multiplied by the carbon content coefficients give us the change in emissions, 
direct and indirect, due to one unit of good i: 
(15)
ii
i coal coal coal oilgas oilgas oilgas Ce Q e Q θθ ∆= ∆ + ∆  
Although the 
i Q ∆  vector gives us the additional electricity and additional refined 
petroleum products used, we do not include them in the calculation because they are secondary 
products. Clearly, it is the production and not the use of electricity that generates CO2, and that is 
captured by the coal, oil, and gas elements. Similarly, gasoline and kerosene are captured at the 
crude oil stage. Not all crude oil and gas are eventually combusted, however, since some is 
turned into lubricants and other chemicals where the carbon remains sequestered. We adjust for Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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this with a simple scaling of the carbon coefficients so that they match emissions derived from 
more detailed calculations.8 
Given the additional carbon embodied in one unit of commodity i, we may assume that a 
carbon tax at rate $
C t /ton will raise the price of i by: 
(16)
QC
ii p tC ∆= ∆  
This expression for the change in prices is the starting point to estimate the cost of carbon 
mitigation policies from the twin perspectives of the initial industrial purchaser and the end user. 
The additional cost to end users is the change in price multiplied by the quantity purchased of 
each commodity. The total cost to all final users of a $
C t  tax (before any behavioral responses 





COST p E ∆= ∆ ∑  
Similarly, the cost to industry j is the change in price of inputs multiplied by the quantity 





COST p A ∆= ∆ ∑  
As noted, this is the gross increase in payments from users. Any offsetting change in 
sales taxes or transfers would have to be considered in any calculation of net costs. 
At this point it would be appropriate to clarify exactly what the above input-output 
analysis does and does not tell us. The use matrix (U) gives us the dollar value of inputs 
purchased by the various industries. It does not give us the quantity of inputs (tons of coal, kWh 
of electricity, etc.). Analysts often derive the quantity of inputs by dividing the dollar values by a 
price, say 
Q
i p , implicitly assuming that all buyers of good i pay the same price. This is not 
always the case, of course, for two reasons. First, industries are distributed unevenly over the 
country and transportation costs often result in differing prices for the same input. Second, even 
though our data are quite disaggregate, each category is made up of many types of 
subcommodities (e.g., different qualities of steel). Different industries buy different baskets of 
these subcommodities and hence have a different average price. The expression for the increased 
                                                 
8 Note that we do not adjust for sequestration in each individual manufacturing industry where it takes place. 
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cost of input i in equation (16) is therefore an average estimate. We are assuming, for example, 
that the basket of steel used by motor vehicles is the same as the basket used by the machinery 
industry. 
To get a closer look at energy costs, we assembled a detailed dataset from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (known as the I-O benchmark working level data) to complement the input-
output data. These data enable us to examine 12 fuels purchased by each industry, compared 
with the 3 categories in the I-O table (see Appendix table A1). Separately, we also assembled a 
detailed dataset on electricity supply and use. These data allow us to allocate total costs among 
(1) direct combustion (coal, liquid fuels, and gas), (2) electricity, and (3) all other intermediate 
inputs. Consistent with the notation of equation (1), the three additional costs of the 
C t  carbon 
charge, per dollar of output j, are : 
(19)
DC C
jf f f j
fD C
COST t e a θ
∈
∆= ∑  
(20) ,
EL C
j electricity j j COST t ELEC θ ∆=  
(21)
ID DC EL
jj jj COST COST COST COST ∆= ∆ − ∆− ∆ 
The cost per dollar of output due to direct combustion (DC, equation 19) is the tax 
multiplied by the carbon content of the 12 fuels used to make a dollar of output. The carbon 
content is the amount of fuel used ( fj a ) multiplied by the energy per unit fuel ( f e ) and the 
carbon content per Btu ( f θ ). We assume that all sectors buy the same average quality of the 12 
fuels. 
The cost per dollar of output due to electricity use is calculated from highly disaggregated 
data, allowing us to index the carbon content coefficient  , electricity j θ  by sector of electricity use. 
The Electric Power Monthly provides data by state (total power generation and quantity of the 
various fuels used), and the Census of Manufactures provides data on shipments by state for each 
sector. Combining these two datasets, we obtain the quantity of electricity used (in kWh) by 
sector j ( j ELEC ) and the carbon emissions per kWh used ( , electricity j θ ). As we see in the next 
section, the data indicate a wide range of values for  , electricity j θ , reflecting the fact that the 
electricity used in some sectors is generated with a much higher proportion of noncarbon 
sources, such as hydropower or nuclear. This means that different industries will experience Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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different costs for purchased electricity if we assume that the noncarbon sources do not adjust 
their prices9 (see Appendix A). Multiplying the quantity of carbon emitted ( , electricity j j ELEC θ ) by 
the carbon charge, 
C t , we get the increase in electricity costs.  
Finally, equation (21) gives the costs due to higher prices of nonenergy intermediate 
goods, calculated as a residual from total costs derived in equation (18) using the input-output 
accounts. As a residual, this term also includes the effect of assuming uniform prices and 
uniform fuel subcomponents in the input-output accounting versus the detailed sectoral accounts 
of equations (19) and (20). 
III. Results: Industry Impacts 
Estimates of the near-term impacts on commodity prices (pi) and industry costs (COSTj) 
associated with an economy-wide carbon charge (or upstream trading system) are presented in 
this section for the 25 commodities and industries that bear the largest impacts. In the case of 
industry costs, these are allocated among direct combustion, purchased electricity, and 
nonenergy intermediate inputs. All results are presented in terms of a per dollar increase in the 
carbon charge. Given the linear assumptions of our model, one could easily scale up for higher 
carbon charges. As noted, however, because of the static nature of the analysis, our inability to 
consider changes in taxes or government spending, and other limitations, the most plausible 
interpretation of the results is in terms of relative as opposed to absolute impacts. All estimates 
are based on 1992 data and expressed in 1992 dollars10.  
Table 1 displays the percentage increase in commodity prices associated with a one dollar 
increase in the carbon charge for the most heavily affected commodities. Petroleum refining tops 
the list with an estimated price increase of 0.68% for each additional dollar of carbon charge. 
Various other refinery products (lubricating oils and greases, asphalt products, carbon black) 
occupy ranks 2–5, although the average price increase of these other products is only about half 
as much as petroleum refining.11 Lime ranks 6, followed by fertilizer and chemical products and 
                                                 
9 In competitive unregulated electricity markets, of course, this assumption will not hold. 
10 The most recent benchmark U.S. input-output table is the one for 1992. More recent tables are available but they 
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11 This is the effect of a carbon tax placed on primary fuels—the simplest administrative approach. To the extent 
that some uses of crude oil (or coal) are not combusted, this is not a perfectly targeted greenhouse gas policy. More 
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by cement. By the time you get down to the 25th commodity (chemicals and other chemical 
preparations), the price increase is only about one-tenth as much as for petroleum refining. 
Among the entire list of 361 commodities, prices vary by two orders of magnitude.12 Overall, 
based on equation 17 and reflecting the number of tons of carbon emitted in 1992, the effect on 
final users of these higher commodity prices due to the $1 per ton carbon charge is to raise total 
expenditures by $1.35 billion per year ($1992).  
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Table 1: Estimated Percentage Increase in Commodity Prices, Top 25 Products, per 




in Commodity Prices  Rank 
310101 Petroleum  refining  0.6796  1 
310103  Products of petroleum and coal, n.e.c.  0.4094  2 
310102 Lubricating  oils and greases  0.3756  3 
270405 Carbon  black  0.2538  4 
310200  Asphalt paving mixtures and blocks  0.2127  5 
361300 Lime  0.1887  6 
270201 Nitrogenous  and  phosphatic fertilizers  0.1688  7 
270100  Industrial inorganic and organic chemicals  0.1483  8 
310300 Asphalt  felts  and  coatings 0.1352  9 
360100 Cement,  hydraulic  0.1275  10 
370101  Blast furnaces and steel mills  0.1082  11 
361400 Gypsum  products  0.1037  12 
360200  Brick and structural clay tile  0.1024  13 
360500  Structural clay products, n.e.c.  0.1007  14 
370102  Electrometallurgical products, except steel  0.1002  15 
270401  Gum and wood chemicals  0.0950  16 
280200 Synthetic  rubber  0.0950  17 
280100  Plastics materials and resins  0.0930  18 
290203  Surface active agents  0.0901  19 
270404 Printing  ink  0.0840  20 
380400 Primary  aluminum  0.0840  21 
370103  Steel wiredrawing and steel nails and spikes  0.0823  22 
280300 Cellulosic  manmade  fibers  0.0814  23 
270402  Adhesives and sealants  0.0751  24 
270406  Chemicals and chemical preparations, n.e.c.  0.0702  25 
We examine two measures of industry impacts associated with our (hypothetical) $1 
dollar per ton increase in carbon charges: the percentage increase in production costs (a measure 
of the intensity of the impacts), and the total increase in production costs (a measure of the total 
burden). The latter measure is simply the product of the percentage cost increase (the first 
measure) and the level of industry output.  
The percentage increase in production costs for the top 25 industries is shown in table 2, 
along with the breakdown according to the sources of the increases. Not surprisingly, the ranking 
of these industries is very similar to the commodity rankings (table 1), reflecting the fact that 
most commodities are made predominantly by just one industry (i.e., the “make” matrix is a 
diagonal matrix with small off-diagonal items). In fact, the first eight industries are identical to 
the commodity rankings. What is noteworthy about the industry rankings is the variation in the Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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contribution to the overall cost increases from the different sources—fuel, purchased electricity, 
and nonenergy intermediate inputs. For example, in the case of petroleum refining, almost all of 
the increase in manufacturing costs arises from increases in the costs of intermediate inputs 
(column 8), mostly crude oil. Relatively minor contributions to the overall cost increase arise 
from direct fuel costs or from purchased electricity (columns 4 and 6). Note that although the 
petroleum refining industry ranks 1 in overall percentage cost increases (column 2) and in 
intermediate input costs (column 9), it ranks 7 for direct fuel costs (column 5) and 76 for 
purchased electricity (column 7).  
Primary aluminum, ranked 13 in the total percentage increase in costs, displays a 
somewhat different story. In contrast to petroleum refining, where costs of intermediate inputs 
dominate, electricity ranks as a more important contributor to cost increases in the primary 
aluminum industry—almost equal in contribution to intermediate purchases. A still different 
story emerges in the case of the lime industry, which ranks 6 in overall percentage increases in 
total costs. Here, the increase in direct fuel costs dominates, and intermediate inputs and 
purchased electricity make relatively small contributions to total cost increases. As in the case of 
commodity prices, by the time one gets down to the 25th industry (clay refractories), the price 
increase is only about one-tenth as much as for the top-ranked petroleum refining. Among the 
entire list of 361 manufacturing industries, price increases vary by two orders of magnitude. In 
figure 1 we graph the distribution of cost effects over these 361 sectors. Clearly, a small number 
of manufacturing industries bear a disproportionate burden of the carbon mitigation policy 
modeled here.  
The residual method of estimating nonenergy intermediate input costs in equation (21) 
gives rise to seemingly anomalous results for electrometallurgical products (ranked 18; I-O 
sector 370102; Standard Industrial Classification, SIC, sector 3313) and the iron and steel 
foundries sector (ranked 129; I-O sector 370200; SIC sector 332). Recall that the total costs 
estimated from the input-output matrices assume a common purchase price, whereas the direct 
combustion and electricity costs are calculated from the detailed Census and Electricity Monthly 
data. To the extent that individual industries have liquid fuel or electricity costs that differ from 
the national average, the total costs  j COST ∆  will misestimate sector j's costs. The extreme case 
of this is illustrated by these two sectors, which use a lot of electricity. The same issue arises in 
the primary aluminum sector (I-O sector 380400; SIC sector 3334). 
According to the Census Bureau, the electrometallurgical industry used 3.92 billion kWh 
in 1992 to produce $1.160 billion worth of output; iron and steel used 72 billion kWh to produce Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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$11.7 billion; the aluminum industry used 60 billion kWh to produce $5.6 billion. The locations 
of plants in these sectors, however, are very different: aluminum plants tend to be close to 
relatively inexpensive hydropower. The result is that the carbon content per kWh for 
electrometallurgical output is 208 tons/million kWh, for iron and steel it is 180 tons/million 
kWh, but for aluminum it is only 42 tons/million kWh. With these very different values of 
, electricty j θ , equation (20) estimates that the electrometallurgical industry bears an increase in 
electricity costs equal to 0.07% of output value, iron and steel bear 0.12%, whereas aluminum 
bears only a 0.045% increase. 
However, from the I-O matrices via equation (18), we estimate that the $1/ton carbon 
charge raises total costs in the electrometallurgical industry by an amount equal to 0.10% of the 
value of output, in iron and steel merely 0.037%, but in aluminum it is 0.11%. Why the 
discrepancy between total costs, and the direct combustion and electricity components, for the 
electrometallurgical and the iron and steel industries? This is explained by the numbers in the use 
table. For the electrometallurgical industry the I-O table reports electricity input worth $111 
million in 1992; for iron and steel, $499 million; but for aluminum, $1,282 million. If we 
compared these dollar values with the number of kWh used, the price per kWh charged to iron 
and steel is less than half that charged to aluminum, and a lot less than for electrometallurgical. 
There is obviously some discrepancy between the I-O data and the electricity data. Further 
investigation will be necessary to reconcile them. If the data are indeed correct, then it would 
indicate that the current I-O table of dimension 484×494 is not sufficiently detailed, and further 
disaggregation of electricity into fossil fuels, hydro, nuclear, and so forth is necessary. Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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Table 2: Estimated Percentage Increase in Manufacturing Costs, Top 25 Industries, per Dollar of Carbon Charge 




















Indirect Cost Rank 
310101  Petroleum  refining  0.7180 1  0.4846 0.0504 5  0.0047  76  0.6629  1 
310103  Products of petroleum and coal, n.e.c. 0.3583  2  0.4860  0.0052  53  0.0060  50  0.3471  2 
310102  Lubricating oils and greases  0.2594 3  0.4924 0.0695 3  0.0012 315  0.1887  5 
270405  Carbon  black  0.2538 4  0.4932 0.0234 12 0.0195  7  0.2109  4 
310200  Asphalt paving mixtures and blocks  0.2199 5  0.4978 0.0041 69 0.0038  95  0.2120  3 
361300  Lime  0.1958 6  0.4987 0.0896 1  0.0246  5  0.0816  10 
270201  Nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers 0.1861 7  0.5055 0.0459 7 0.0133  21  0.1269 7 
310300  Asphalt felts and coatings  0.1339 8  0.5080 0.0018 147  0.0029  145  0.1292  6 
360100  Cement,  hydraulic  0.1288 9  0.5106 0.0477 6  0.0420  4  0.0391  53 
370101  Blast furnaces and steel mills  0.1225  10  0.5369  0.0886  2  0.0203  6  0.0136  320 
270100  Industrial inorganic and organic 
chemicals 
0.1195 11  0.5914 0.0087 36 0.0194  8  0.0915  9 
361400  Gypsum  products  0.1037 12  0.5925 0.0348 9  0.0109  24  0.0580  19 
380400  Primary  aluminum  0.1034 13  0.5954 0.0114 29 0.0449  3  0.0471  30 
360200  Brick and structural clay tile  0.1022  14  0.5960  0.0427  8  0.0155  14  0.0441  34 
270401  Gum and wood chemicals  0.1018  15  0.5964  0.0572  4  0.0045  81  0.0402  50 
270202 Fertilizers,  mixing  only  0.1014  16  0.5973 0.0050 54 0.0027 156  0.0937  8 
360500  Structural clay products, n.e.c.  0.1007  17  0.5974  0.0337  10  0.0059  51  0.0610  18 
370102  Electrometallurgical products, except 
steel 
0.1005 18  0.5980 0.0319 11 0.0702  2  -0.0016  360 
280200  Synthetic  rubber  0.0915 19  0.5999 0.0067 45 0.0099  28  0.0749  11 
280100  Plastics materials and resins  0.0879 20  0.6139 0.0038 75 0.0113  23  0.0728  12 
270404  Printing  ink  0.0852 21  0.6152 0.0137 21 0.0015  282  0.0701  14 
280300  Cellulosic  manmade  fibers  0.0822 22  0.6159 0.0090 35 0.0040  90  0.0691  16 Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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270402  Adhesives and sealants  0.0762  23  0.6180 0.0014 189  0.0022 204  0.0727  13 
290203  Surface active agents  0.0759  24  0.6191 0.0031 84 0.0029 143  0.0699  15 




Figure 1. Distribution of Percentage Cost Increase per Dollar of Carbon Charge 
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Table 3 displays the total increase in production costs per dollar of increased carbon 
charge for the top 25 industries. Since we are examining changes in total costs, which reflect 
both the intensity of the burden and the size of the industry, we would expect a different ordering 
than observed for the percentage cost increases. Thus, although petroleum refining again tops the 
list, with total increases in costs of $948 million per dollar increase in carbon charges (equivalent 
to 48.5% of total costs to the manufacturing sector), the rankings for other industries are quite 
different. For example, chemicals (inorganic and organic), blast furnaces and steel mills, and 
motor vehicles and passenger car bodies rank 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Note, however, the steep 
decline in the increases in total costs as one descends the list. The total costs for inorganic and 
organic chemicals, ranked 2, are only 11% as much as petroleum refining, ranked 1. Total costs 
for the drug industry, ranked 16, are only about 1% of the costs for petroleum refining. Overall, a 
very few manufacturing industries bear the bulk of the sector-wide costs. The top 10 industries, 
for example, account for about two-thirds of all manufacturing costs, and the top 25 industries 
account for almost three-fourths of the total. For purposes of comparison, it is noteworthy that 
the top 25 industries in percentage increase in costs account for a somewhat lower proportion of 
total costs (column 2 in table 2 versus column 2 in table 3.) Figure 2 displays the distribution of 
total costs. The extreme skew of the distribution reflects the highly uneven burden among 
industries. 
Also of interest in table 3 are the wide discrepancies in total costs attributable to the 
different sources of carbon inputs. For example, blast furnaces and steel mills are relatively large 
purchasers of fuel for direct combustion and of electricity but more modest users of carbon-
intensive nonenergy intermediate inputs. In contrast, the motor vehicles and passenger car body 
industry is a heavy user of nonenergy intermediate inputs (reflecting the many outsourced 
components used in cars) but a relatively light user of fuels and electricity. Overall, nonenergy 
intermediate inputs constitute the single largest component of the carbon costs among the 25 
industries ranked highest for total manufacturing costs.  Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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Table 3: Estimated Increase in Total Manufacturing Costs, Top 25 Industries, per Dollar of Carbon Charge 
    1 2  3  4  5 6 7 8 9 
Industry 




Cost Fuel  Cost Rank
Cost of 
Purchased 
Electricity  Rank Indirect Cost Rank
310101  Petroleum  refining  947760000  1 0.4846  66528000 1 6204000  5 875028000  1 
270100  Industrial inorganic and organic chemicals  106594000  2 0.5391  7760400  4 17304800  1 81618000  2 
370101  Blast furnaces and steel mills  51450000  3  0.5654  37212000 2  8526000  3  5712000  28 
590301  Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies 40317000  4  0.5860  1057000  12 1661000 11 37448000  3 
320400  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c. 34928600  5  0.6038  736200 20  4826200  6  29366200 4 
240800  Paper and paperboard mills  32749700  6 0.6206  9279900  3 7414100  4 16006600  7 
280100  Plastics materials and resins  27336900  7 0.6346  1181800  11  3514300  7 22640800  5 
590302  Motor vehicle parts and accessories 21502800  8  0.6455  941200 15  2678800  8  17882800 6 
260501  Commercial  printing  15264000  9  0.6534  345600  44 1440000 14 13478400  9 
250000  Paperboard containers and boxes  14833500  10 0.6609  893200  16 797500  23 13142800  10 
140101  Meat  packing  plants  14816700  11 0.6685  391200  37 733500  29 13740900  8 
270201  Nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers 13268930  12  0.6753  3272670 6  948290  20  9047970  13 
180400  Apparel made from purchased materials 12632400  13 0.6818  417600  34 783000  25 11431800  11 
310102  Lubricating oils and greases  12503080 14  0.6881  3349900 5  57840  228  9095340  12 
160100 Broadwoven  fabric mills and fabric 
finishing plants 
11256000  15 0.6939  728000  21 1624000 13 8876000 14 
290100  Drugs  9718500 16 0.6989  564300  24 752400  28 8401800 16 
310200  Asphalt paving mixtures and blocks  8927940 17 0.7034  166460  82 154280  127  8607200 15 
600100  Aircraft  8516400 18 0.7078  282000  52 564000  35 7670400 18 
300000  Paints and allied products 8434800  19  0.7121  127800 103 184600  115 8122400  17 
140105  Poultry slaughtering and processing 8382400  20  0.7164  272800  58 719200  30 7390400 19 
380800  Aluminum rolling and drawing  7962400 21 0.7205  1213600  10 1021200 19 5712800 27 
280400  Manmade organic fibers, except cellulosic  7525800  22  0.7243  321900  46  799200  22  6404700  20 
410201  Automotive  stampings  7143500 23 0.7280  109900  121  659400  31 6374200 22 
140600  Fluid  milk  7072300 24 0.7316  275800  55 433400  49 6382800 21 
361200 Ready-mixed  concrete  6949600 25 0.7351  999600  13 214200  97 5735800 26 Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Total Costs per Dollar of Carbon Charge Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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IV. Policy Comparisons 
Despite its intellectual appeal, an economy-wide carbon charge (or upstream emissions 
trading system) is not the only option for reducing GHG emissions. Various forms of so-called 
downstream policies have also been discussed. For example, S.556, introduced in the 107th 
Congress, envisions a tradable permit system imposed on power plants to control carbon 
dioxide.13 Such an approach would increase the cost of using carbon in electricity generation 
only. Direct combustion of coal, oil, or gas outside the electric power industry would not be 
covered.  
Table 4 compares the impacts of an economy-wide policy versus an electricity-only 
policy on manufacturing industries. The per ton charge on carbon inputs is equal for the two 
policies. However, the former policy affects all carbon inputs, direct and indirect, used in the 
manufacturing sector, but the latter affects only carbon used in the production of electricity. 
Manufacturing industries relying heavily on electricity or nonfuel inputs that in turn rely heavily 
on electricity—for example, the higher cost of aluminum car parts purchased by the auto 
industry—would be most adversely affected.  
The left side of table 4 displays the 10 industries hardest hit by the economy-wide policy 
and their corresponding ranking (among the 361 manufacturing industries) for the electricity-
only policy. Petroleum refining, hardest hit by the economy-wide policy, ranks 145 for the 
electricity-only policy. Eight of the 10 industries hardest hit by the economy-wide policy rank 
lower (or the same) for the electricity-only policy—in most cases considerably lower. 
The right side of table 4 displays the 10 industries hardest hit by the electricity-only 
policy along with their corresponding ranking for the economy-wide policy. The hardest hit—
aluminum—ranks 13 for the economy-wide policy. All of the top 10 under the electricity-only 
policy rank lower (or the same) for the economy-wide policy—in many cases substantially 
lower. The key conclusion of this comparison of alternative policies is clear: manufacturing 
industries are affected very differently by the economy-wide regulation of carbon versus 
regulation of the electric power sector only. Many of those industries hardest hit by one policy 
tend not to be so adversely affected by the other, and vice versa.  
                                                 
13 Regulation of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury are also proposed in this so-called Four-Pollutant Bill. Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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Table 4: Comparison of Economy-Wide and Electricity-Only Policies 
Ranked by Economy-Wide Policy  Ranked by Electricity-Wide Policy 
Industry 
Economy-Wide 
Carbon Charge  Rank 
Electricity-Only 
Carbon Charge Rank  Industry 
Economy-Wide 
Carbon Charge Rank 
Electricity Only 
Carbon Charge Rank 
Petroleum refining  0.718  1  0.007  145  Primary aluminum  0.103  13  0.064  1 
Products of 
petroleum and coal, 
n.e.c. 
0.358 2  0.006  191  Electrometallurgical 
products, except steel 
0.101 18  0.032 2 
Lubricating oils and 
greases 
0.259 3  0.007  154  Cement,  hydraulic  0.129 9  0.027 3 
Carbon black  0.254  4  0.011  36  Aluminum rolling and 
drawing 
0.054 49  0.021 4 
Asphalt paving 
mixtures and blocks 
0.220  5  0.009  76  Primary smelting and 
refining of copper 
0.052 52  0.019 5 
Lime  0.196 6  0.017  6  Lime  0.196 6  0.017 6 
Nitrogenous and 
phosphatic fertilizers 
0.186 7  0.011  25  Primary  nonferrous 
metals, n.e.c. 
0.048 64  0.017 7 
Asphalt felts and 
coatings 
0.134  8  0.006  196  Blast furnaces and steel 
mills 
0.123 10  0.016 8 
Cement, hydraulic  0.129  9  0.027  3  Metal cans  0.054  48  0.016  9 
Blast furnaces and 
steel mills 
0.123 10  0.016  8  Aluminum  castings  0.039 95  0.015 10 
.        Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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V. Comparisons across Model Types and Data Aggregation Levels 
The impacts on manufacturing industries of carbon mitigation policies presented in the 
previous section differ from more commonly available analyses in two principal respects: 1) the 
focus is on short-term impacts rather than the longer-term effects typically addressed in dynamic, 
general equilibrium models; and 2) the results are highly disaggregate in nature, based on four-
digit industry classification codes rather than the more standard two-digit approach. This section 
examines the twin questions of how the short- and longer-term results compare and how the two- 
and four-digit results compare. Answers to the first question can provide insight into whether the 
industries identified as most heavily impacted in the short term are the same ones predicted to 
experience long-term burdens as well. Answers to the second question indicate the value of 
dealing with such a detailed dataset in addressing issues of relative distribution within the 
manufacturing sector. 
A. Short Run versus Long Run 
There are two aspects of the short-run versus long-run comparisons: the relative size of 
the overall price increases estimated in the long-run versus the short-run models, and the relative 
distribution among the different industries estimated by the different modeling approaches.14 On 
the first point, the direction of the difference is clear: in the long run, technological innovation 
and substitutions away from carbon-intensive fuels will tend to drive down costs over time. The 
only question is by how much. Clearly, the model presented here, which calculates the increase 
in production costs assuming fixed capital and other inputs, should be seen as an upper-bound 
estimate of the price changes in individual industries. As noted, the real value of the analysis is 
its relevance to relative burdens within the manufacturing sector rather than as a measure of 
absolute costs. 
We should discuss here the different uses of the word "cost" in the literature. When 
economists using the long-run models say that carbon control costs x% of GDP, they mean that 
the reduction in welfare when consumption patterns change in response to changes in prices is 
                                                 
14 By long-run analyses we mean those that allow substitution among inputs, whether or not the substitution occurs 
within a static or dynamic framework. Dynamic models allow a richer set of changes, like investment and 
technology change, but static models that allow substitution would still show a much smaller change than what we 
refer to as short-run analysis. Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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equal to x% of GDP. One way to think about this is that society is forced by the tax wedges to 
move to a different point on the production possibilities frontier (PPF), a point that delivers 
lower utility. This does not mean that the PPF has shrunk or that some workers are idle. In the 
short run, the welfare costs to society should include adjustment costs as capital and labor are 
reallocated; that is, the PPF might actually shrink during the transition. This is not what is 
calculated in this paper. What is calculated is the increase in the bill for intermediate inputs for 
an industry, assuming the full price changes have been passed through to it. If the industry, in 
turn, passes on 100% of these costs, then the price of its output rises by the amount tabulated. 
The welfare costs to the owners and workers of the firm are distinct from these price changes, 
although they could well be related.15 
We shall therefore not be discussing welfare costs but price changes. For the relative 
price changes among industries, the differences between the long run and the short run are not 
obvious a priori. Since individual industries exhibit different degrees of factor substitution and 
technological change, the relative impacts over time may differ across industries. One way to 
think about this issue is to compare our results with those of a long-run, dynamic model. The 
most disaggregate model we are aware of is the one developed by Jorgensen and Wilcoxen 
(1993) and Ho and Jorgensen (1998), which presents estimates at the modified two-digit I-O 
level for 21 manufacturing industries. 
To compare the results of the two modeling approaches, we aggregate our (weighted) 
estimates of percentage cost increases per dollar of carbon charge across the same modified two-
digit industry classification used by Ho and Jorgensen. Table 5 presents the estimates of these 
long-run price increases normalized to the level of the most impacted industry (petroleum 
refining), along with similarly transformed results derived from our model (table 2). Simple 
inspection indicates a quite similar, albeit not identical, ranking between the two modeling 
approaches. Four of our five most impacted industries also rank in their top five. Nine of our top 
ten industries rank in Ho and Jorgensen’s top ten. The simple correlation coefficient between Ho 
and Jorgensen’s impacts and ours is 0.96, which implies that 92% (0.96
2) of the variation across 
Ho and Jorgensen’s results is explained by our short-run analysis. From this comparison we 
conclude that at the two-digit level, the relative burden of carbon mitigation policies falls on 
much the same industries in the short run as it does in the longer term.  
                                                 
15 To the extent that relative welfare costs are related to the relative price changes, we can interpret the reported as a 
welfare measure. Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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Table 5: Relative Impacts across Two-Digit Manufacturing Industries16 





31 Refining  1.00    1  1.000  1 
37, 38  Primary metals  0.34   2  0.106  3 
27A, 27B, 29A, 29B, 30  Chemicals  0.31   3  0.107  2 
35, 36  Glass, etc.  0.31   4  0.092  4 
16, 17  Textiles  0.29   5  0.062  7 
28, 32  Rubber, plastic  0.26   6  0.081  5 
24, 25  Paper  0.26   7  0.076  6 
15 Tobacco  0.20    8  0.045  10 
14 Food  products  0.19    9  0.021  21 
39-42  Fab. metals  0.16   10  0.056  8 
20, 21  Lumber, wood  0.16   11  0.037  15 
18, 19  Apparel  0.16   12  0.041  12 
22, 23  Furniture  0.15   13  0.039  13 
62, 63  Instruments  0.15   14  0.022  20 
64 Miscellaneous  manufacturing  0.14    15  0.037  14 
26A, 26B  Printing  0.14   16  0.028  18 
43-52  Nonelec. mach  0.13   17  0.030  16 
59A, 59B  Motor vehicles  0.13   18  0.041  11 
33, 34  Leather  0.12   19  0.051  9 
53-58  Elec. Mach  0.11   20  0.029  17 
13, 60, 61  Other Trans Eq  0.11   21  0.024  19 
 
                                                 
16 See text for definitions. Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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B. The Value of Disaggregating at the Four-Digit Level 
Figure 3 displays the distributions of estimated changes in industry costs of four-digit 
industries within each of 21 two-digit industries (the same industries as in table 4). In each 
subplot, the star on the horizontal axis represents the weighted mean of the percentage increase 
in costs for that specific two-digit industry. It is clear that the weighted mean can overstate or 
understate the true burden. The use of the two-digit classification scheme masks sometimes 
wide, skewed, or even bimodal distributions of costs. This implies that use of an average value 
for costs for each of the two-digit industries may not be suitable for understanding the specific 
nature of the industry-level impacts or for designing appropriate remedies.  
 Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Two- and Four-Digit Classification Schemes 
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VI. Conclusions 
As the experience of the failed Btu tax demonstrates, policymakers need to understand 
who pays for carbon mitigation policies. Detailed information on the relative short-term burdens 
imposed by carbon mitigation policies is a prerequisite for designing appropriate policy 
responses. The focus in this paper is on manufacturing industries. Thus, we are looking at the 
impacts on an important class of energy users rather than on the more traditionally studied 
industries like fossil fuel producers or electricity generators.  
To develop industry-specific estimates on the basis of existing data, certain simplifying 
assumptions are adopted about both the type of carbon mitigation policies employed and the 
nature of the behavioral responses in the economy. The principal policy considered is a market-
based approach that fixes a uniform cost per ton of carbon via an upstream permit or tax placed 
on primary fossil fuels (coal, crude oil, natural gas). A downstream policy focused exclusively 
on the electric power industry is also examined. Regarding the economic response, we assume 
the per ton costs of the carbon mitigation policy are passed on in the short run in proportion to 
carbon use. This approach, which freezes capital and other inputs at current levels and assumes 
that all costs are passed forward, yields upper-bound estimates of total costs. Thus, the results 
should be viewed as descriptive of relative burdens within the manufacturing sector rather than 
as a measure of absolute costs. Given these assumptions, the conclusions of this paper can be 
summarized as follows: 
•  The variation in estimated end-user price impacts is considerable—about two orders 
of magnitude—when viewed across the 361 commodities examined. Only a relatively 
small number of commodities experience the large increases. 
•  The variation in industry-level cost impacts, measured as the percentage change in 
costs, is also about two orders of magnitude. Like the commodity price effects, the 
distribution is highly skewed toward the lower end. Only a few industries experience 
relatively large burdens. 
•  There is considerable variability within industries regarding the causes of the 
estimated cost increases. For some industries, the cost increase is driven by 
interindustry purchases of nonenergy intermediate inputs. For others, direct fuel costs 
or purchased electricity is most important. Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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•  Total industry cost increases, reflecting the percentage cost increases and industry 
size, vary by four orders of magnitude across the 361 manufacturing industry 
categories examined. For the economy-wide carbon policy, a single industry, 
petroleum, accounts for almost half of the total cost to the manufacturing sector, 
largely reflecting increased costs for purchased crude oil. The top 10 industries 
account for almost two-thirds of the total cost to the manufacturing sector. 
•  With a downstream policy, such as an electricity-only approach, similar cross-
industry variation is observed, but a very different set of industries is affected. In fact, 
many of the industries hardest hit by the economy-wide policy tend not to be so 
adversely affected by the electricity-only policy, and vice versa. 
Overall, the principal conclusion of this research is that within the manufacturing sector 
(which by definition excludes coal production and electricity generation), only a small number of 
industries would bear a disproportionate short-term burden of a carbon mitigation policy. Even 
this statement needs to be qualified, however, since some or all of this burden is likely to be 
shifted forward by these industries to their customers. In effect, the who pays issue addressed 
here is more accurately described as who pays initially. The ultimate effect on corporate profits 
may be negligible (or even positive). As the policy process places greater emphasis on the who 
pays issue, information on the identity of the affected industries and the magnitude of the 
disproportionate (initial) burdens borne by a few manufacturing industries can prove invaluable 
in designing policies to make the distributional impacts more uniform, thereby avoiding the 
concentration of costs on a few key industries. This knowledge may enhance the political 
feasibility of future carbon mitigation policies. Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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Appendix: Derivation of Direct Combustion and Electricity Factors 
In this appendix we describe how the costs due to direct combustion and to electricity use 
are derived from the detailed data. Direct carbon emissions are those from fossil fuels—coal, 
crude oil, refined petroleum, and gas—bought directly by each industry.  
Fossil Fuel Carbon Emission Factors  
For fossil fuel carbon emissions we derive industry-specific estimates. For each of 12 
fossil fuels, as listed in table A-1, the carbon emissions from sector j are calculated by dividing 
the value of the fuel purchased by the price and then multiplying by the carbon content 
coefficient. For each industry, total fossil fuel carbon emissions are obtained by summing over 
these 12 sources. The total emissions divided by sector j's output gives us the industry-specific 




















f is the index of fuel types, pvfj is the purchased value of fuel f, pf is the fuel price ($ per 
Btu),  f θ  is the carbon content (tons per Btu), and  j X  is the industry output. This direct 
combustion (DC) emission factor is calculated for all 498 industries. 
The purchased values of various fuels are from the 1992 I-O benchmark working level 
data (BEA 1997). The information on fuel prices, other than coal prices, are from State Energy 
Price and Expenditure Report (EIA 1997b). For coal we chose to derive a price such that the 
total national carbon emissions from coal combustion (the numerator of equation A1 summed 
over all users) are equal to the estimate from EIA (1997a). Carbon content coefficients are 
obtained from EIA (2000). These prices and  f θ 's are given in table A1.  Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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b  25.29 
Anthracite mining  1.91
b 25.29 
Crude petroleum  15.99
d 20.22 
Natural gas liquid  3.59  16.99 
Natural gas  3.89  14.40 
Aviation gasoline  8.18  19.14 
Motor gasoline  8.96  19.14 
Jet fuel  4.52  19.14 
Light fuel oil  7.11  19.75 
Heavy fuel oil  2.27  21.28 
Liquefied petroleum gases  6.19  17.11 
Coke and breeze  2.15  25.51
f 
a. Fuel prices are from State Energy Price and Expenditure Report (EIA 1997b) unless noted. 
b. Derived by authors, so that national carbon emissions from coal combustion equal that estimated in EIA (1997a), 
table 5. 
c. Crude petroleum is considered only in the refining industry. Crude petroleum purchased by other industries is 
considered feedstock. Thus, carbon emissions from purchased crude are not calculated for other industries. Crude 
petroleum can be used for two purposes in the refining industry: as a feedstock or as a fuel. We assume that 10% of 
crude (on a basis of Btu content) is used as a fuel and 90% as a feedstock (Kolb 2001).  
d. The price is in U.S. $/bbl. This is converted to $/Btu using a rate of 6.056 MBtu/bbl obtained from Manufacturing 
Energy Consumption Survey 1991 (EIA 1994). 
e. Carbon content (million metric tons of carbon) are from Annual Energy Outlook 2001 (EIA 2000). 
f. Derived using data from Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1996 (EIA 1997a). 
Electricity Carbon Emission Factors 
For carbon emissions from purchased electricity, we derive emission factors from data 
that are more detailed than those for fossil fuels. The derivation involves the following steps: 
1.  The carbon emissions per unit of electric energy generated are estimated by state 
using data from Electric Power Monthly.  Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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2.  The output share by state for each industry j is estimated using the output data by 
state and by industry obtained from the 1992 Economic Census (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1994). The industries in this dataset are classified by SIC codes. With this we 
estimate the electricity emissions by state for each industry. 
3.  The electricity carbon emissions from industry j are the sum over states of each state's 
emissions by j. This divided by the output of j gives the electricity carbon emissions 
per dollar of output.  
4.  Finally, we match the SIC code with the I-O industry code for use with the input-
output matrices. 
The detailed procedures for estimating electricity emissions are described below.  
1) Carbon emission per million kwh electricity generated by states (metric tons per million 
kwh). 
We consider electricity carbon emissions from three fossil fuels—coal, petroleum, and 
gas. The physical quantities of coal, petroleum, and gas used by states to generate electricity are 
obtained from Electric Power Monthly (EIA 1993). The individual fuel quantities are converted 
to energy using conversion factors from Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey 1991. This 
energy consumption is multiplied by carbon emission coefficients (from Emissions of 
Greenhouse Gases in the United States, EIA 1997a) to obtain carbon emissions by state by 
aggregating carbon emissions from coal, petroleum, and gas. Carbon emissions per unit of 
electricity generated (metric tons per million kWh) are calculated by dividing state carbon 
emissions with state net electricity generation. In Table A-2, we present the electricity carbon 
emissions for the nation and individual states. The average carbon emission from electricity 
generation is about 180.9 metric tons per million kWh. The range is from 0 (Idaho) to 462 (North 
Dakota). A state with a high coefficient means it uses a high share of fossil fuel to generate 
electricity. A smaller coefficient indicates a higher use of hydro or nuclear power.  Resources for the Future  Morgenstern, Ho, Shih, and Zhang 
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(Metric Tons per 
Million Kwh) 
  Alabama  10857.6 68374.0 158.8 
  Alaska  492.1 2980.0 165.1 
  Arizona  7629.8 52722.0 144.7 
  Arkansas  5419.2 27541.0 196.8 
  California  6233.6 89701.0 69.5 
  Colorado  6879.0 23983.0 286.8 
  Connecticut     1206.7 19308.0 62.5 
  Delaware  1103.4 4941.0 223.3 
  District of Columbia  29.9 74.0 403.6 
  Florida  17847.4 103809.0 171.9 
  Georgia 10379.8 68908.0 150.6 
  Hawaii  1161.4 5301.0 219.1 
  Idaho  0.0 4993.0 0.0 
  Illinois  11308.0 93424.0 121.0 
  Indiana  19893.9 71633.0 277.7 
  Iowa  6741.0 22219.0 303.4 
  Kansas  6223.3 23606.0 263.6 
  Kentucky 13500.7 57209.0 236.0 
  Louisiana  8793.1 43072.0 204.1 
  Maine  239.3 6021.0 39.7 
  Maryland 4554.5 29109.0 156.5 
  Massachusetts  4174.0 25254.0 165.3 
  Michigan 12424.0 62171.0 199.8 
  Minnesota  6629.7 29038.0 228.3 
  Mississippi 2348.9 16187.0 145.1 
  Missouri  10161.1 41586.0 244.3 
  Montana  4484.3 18521.0 242.1 
  Nebraska  3482.1 16510.0 210.9 
  Nevada  3804.0 16153.0 235.5 
  New Hampshire 727.3 10853.0 67.0 
  New Jersey 1550.5 22562.0 68.7 
  New Mexico  6458.8 20369.0 317.1 
  New York 9873.3 84002.0 117.5 
  North Carolina  9306.1 63030.0 147.6 
  North Dakota  9744.3 21060.0 462.7 
  Ohio  21933.0 102417.0 214.2 
  Oklahoma  8806.1 35114.0 250.8 
  Oregon 979.6 31099.0 31.5 
  Pennsylvania 18139.9 127446.0 142.3 
  Rhode Island  26.2 101.0 259.3 
  South Carolina  4102.6 53597.0 76.5 
  South Dakota  971.5 4879.0 199.1 
  Tennessee  9151.4 57253.0 159.8 
  Texas  49010.9 185738.0 263.9 
  Utah  5902.6 24461.0 241.3 
  Vermont  10.6 3365.0 3.1 
  Virginia 4255.3 37051.0 114.8 
  Washington 2637.2 63174.0 41.7 
  West Virginia 11867.8 53339.0 222.5 
  Wisconsin  7700.7 34386.0 223.9 
  Wyoming 10580.0 30898.0 342.4 
U.S.   381737.6 2110542.0 180.9 
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2,3) Electricity Carbon Intensity for Individual Sector 
Here we combine the electricity carbon emissions by state derived in the previous section 
with the industrial output by state from the 1992 Economic Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1994). The total value of shipments (TVS) of 458 four-digit SIC manufacturing sectors by states 
is extracted from the Census of Manufactures CD-ROM (1992). For each industry, we calculated 
its output share by state. We assume that industries do not purchase electricity across states. For 
each industry, the weighted carbon emission per kWh is calculated by multiplying the state share 
of output with the carbon emission per million kWh of that state, and then summing over all 
states. For each SIC industry j, the share-weighted carbon emission per kWh electricity 
consumed is multiplied by the total quantity of electricity purchased by j to obtain total 
electricity carbon emissions by industry. The quantity of electricity is also given in the Economic 
Census. The carbon emissions by industry are then divided by output to obtain industry 
electricity carbon emissions per unit of output.  
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4) Matching Manufacturing Sectors 
Since we are using I-O industry classifications in this study, we then match the 458 four-
digit SIC data with the 361 six-digit I-O manufacturing sectors. For multiple four-digit SIC 
industries mapping into a single six-digit I-O industry, we divide the total carbon emissions of 
these SIC industries by their total output to obtain industry carbon emissions of the 
corresponding six-digit I-O industry.  
  